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Chiang Kai-shek’s “secret deal” at Xian and the
start of the Sino-Japanese War
Steve Tsang1
ABSTRACT Using newly available archives, particularly the diary and the presidential
papers of Chiang Kai-shek, this article challenges the conventional interpretations of the Xian
Incident (1936), in particular the widely held belief that the kidnapping of China’s leader
Chiang by two rebellious generals forced him to form a united front with the Communist
Party to confront Japanese aggression, and of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
7 months later. It puts forth the interpretation that full-scale war between China and Japan
was started not by Japan but by Chiang after a Japanese provocation, and the united front
was only formed after Chiang ordered his best army units to attack Japanese forces in
Shanghai in August 1937 turning it into the largest land battle after the First World War.
It must be noted, however, that Japan acted provocatively and aggressively in a local incident
outside Beijing a month earlier. Chiang decided on war not because he reached an agreement
with the Chinese Communists to form a united front whilst a captive in Xian but because in
Xian he received a signal from Josef Stalin that the Soviet Union would support him in a war
with Japan. Chiang read Stalin right and the Soviet Union became the largest supplier of
weapons to China in the ﬁrst 4 years of China’s 8-year war with Japan. The hitherto unknown
or “secret deal” Chiang made in Xian was an implicit one with Stalin, not with the Chinese
Communist Party or its man on the spot Zhou Enlai.
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Introduction
The Xian Incident of December 1936 was an event ofmonumental importance. It caused the Chinese leaderChiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) to rethink and, indeed,
reverse his priorities that had major long-term consequences.
Until then he was committed to exterminate the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) as a prerequisite to building up the
necessary national capacity for China to defend itself against
Japan, and used compromises to slow down unrelenting Japanese
aggressive moves in Northern China. At Xian Chiang found out
that a workable alternative existed for confronting Japanese
aggression, which gave him the option to stand ﬁrm against the
next Japanese aggressive move. As a result, when Japanese forces
in North China provoked the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July
1937, Chiang did not appease the Japanese and took actions that
transformed another local incident into the starting point of
China’s War of Resistance against Japan (1937–1945).
This chain of events dramatically changed the fortune of the
exhausted and heavily depleted CCP struggling to survive in the
poor northwest of China. It enabled the CCP to revive and
expand dramatically and exponentially during the war, ultimately
seizing control of the mainland of China in 1949. Without the
Xian Incident it is doubtful if full-scale war between China
and Japan would have started in 1937, though it most probably
could not have been avoided for long. Whether the CCP could
otherwise have survived Chiang’s “ﬁnal push” in his extermina-
tion campaign cannot be known. What was certain was that the
Incident enabled the CCP to reverse its fortune and get out of the
blind alleyway to which it had been driven deeper and deeper by
Chiang after 1934 (Chen, 2001). Even though Chiang simulta-
neously conducted parallel covert negotiations with the CCP as
well as the Soviet Union prior to the Incident, his programme to
exterminate the CCP only ceased as a result of the dramatic
events in Xian. It was a turning point for the CCP. Even top
Communist leaders like Zhou (1980) saw it at the time (a paper
dated 29 December 1936).
Most existing scholarly works and personal accounts of the
Incident focus on the intrigues and dramas in Xian, the CCP
headquarters in Baoan, the Chinese capital Nanjing and the
Soviet capital Moscow.1 Even though there is not one agreed
narrative of the Xian Incident, the prevailing view is that while
the CCP did not stage the incident it played a pivotal role through
Zhou Enlai in ending it. It is widely believed that Zhou secured
the release of Chiang Kai-shek by getting Chiang to agree to form
a united front with the CCP against Japan. This formed the basis
for China to stand ﬁrm against Japan the following summer when
the Japanese capitalized on an incident in the Marco Polo Bridge
area outside Beijing to stage a more general aggression in
Shanghai, in respond to which Chiang led the Chinese nation to
resist in a war that lasted 8 years. This paper challenges this
conventional wisdom.
Fascinating as the drama in Xian is, the real signiﬁcance of the
incident is how it affected the Chinese government’s decision to
respond when Japan made its next major aggressive move. Most
works on the Sino-Japanese War gloss over how China ﬁnally
made a stand against unrelenting Japanese aggression (Ch’i, 1982;
Mitter, 2013; Lary, 2007; van de Ven, 2003; Ma, 1993). Even
those that relate the Xian Incident to the start of the war works
on the basis that the Incident “radically changed the position of
the Nationalist Government, as it indicated that Chiang could
no longer force his anticommunist campaign on his military
subordinates” and seized on the “new mood of national unity”
and “resolved to resist any further Japanese provocation” (Shyu,
2001). This overlooks the reality that Chiang could not decide to act
on a matter with existential implications for the country just because
the “national mood” changed. The reality was that while the Incident
did change Chiang’s sense of priority and that of his government
there was a more powerful and decisive factor at work.
The long-standing ofﬁcial account of the Incident, based on
what Chiang would like the world to think, asserts that the young
Marshall Zhang Xueliang, who staged a mutiny and held Chiang
captive in Xian, reversed course and freed Chiang as he was
moved by how determined Chiang was to resist Japanese
imperialism after reading Chiang’s Diary.2 This has rightly been
discounted by Young-Tsu Wong. Wong also dismisses the
alternative interpretation put forward by John Garver and Hans
van de Ven that the Soviet Union played a key role in ending the
kidnapping. Wang argues that Chiang was not “released by order
of Moscow” but “because he met Zhang’s demands” (Wong). In
Wong’s revisionist assessment although Chiang “could have
disregarded what he had agreed to do in Xi’an … his sudden rise
in popularity upon his release, due to his identiﬁcation now with
the rising tide of anti-Japanese nationalism, made it more than
ever difﬁcult for him to oppose resistance in favor of continuing
the civil war” (Ibid.: 24). But others, from Yang Kuisong to Jay
Taylor, prefer to stress the important role played by the Chinese
Communist Party in ending the Incident (Yang, 1995; Taylor,
2009). Apart from Taylor none of the others examined in any
detail how Chiang reacted in captivity and why he made a deal.
Nor did they probe into the link between the Incident and
the start of the war. Taylor’s emphasis on the personal rapport
between the Communist leader Zhou Enlai and Chiang
as the key factor is, however, unconvincing. Chiang was too
much of a realist and not enough of a sentimentalist for that. To
settle the controversies over how the Incident was ended, one
must examine how Chiang assessed his own predicament in
captivity and the conditions for his release, and see how they
inﬂuenced his decision to go to war with Japan the following
summer.
Newly available sources, the most important of which are
Chiang Kai-shek’s diary at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University and his presidential papers at the Academia Historica
in Taipei, have now make it possible to re-evaluate the deal that
Chiang made in Xian for his own release. Also valuable is the
Xian Diary of TV Soong (also at the Hoover Institution), as he
was the key intermediary who did most of the actual negotiation
between Chiang and his captors.3 For this purpose Zhang’s oral
history account at Columbia University and various publications
based on interviews with him after he regained freedom are not
particularly illuminating, as Zhang refused to speak about the
Incident in detail.
The deal was more complex than the mainstream interpreta-
tion that “Chiang’s hand was forced in December 1936, when he
was kidnapped by … Zhang … [and as a result] came to an
accord with the CCP, and the two sides agreed to hold back from
conﬂict with each other, while waiting for any further moves from
Japan” (Mitter, 2004). On the basis of these recently available
archival sources this paper sheds light on how Chiang assessed his
predicament in captivity and secured his own release. It also
examines how the settlement in Xian underpinned Chiang’s
conﬁdence to risk going to war with Japan before a “united front”
with the CCP was agreed.
As it will be explained, there were in fact two parallel elements
to “the deal” that secured Chiang’s release. One was negotiated
between Chiang’s agents and his real captors, which was what
Young-Tsu Wong focused on. The other, and from Chiang’s
perspective the really important one, was an implicit under-
standing he thought he had with Stalin. There was no written
agreement between Chiang and the CCP or the Soviet Union to
form a united front against Japan though Chiang did make verbal
undertakings to the Communists and his real captors. What
Chiang thought was most important was, however, something
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else. It was that he had ascertained in Xian the intentions of the
Soviet leader Josef Stalin. As he tried to work out a basis for his
own release Chiang came to the conclusion that Stalin would
support him in a war against Japan, a matter about which he did
not have conﬁdence hitherto. This was crucial to Chiang’s
decision to hold ﬁrm, half a year later, over an incident that
involved the missing of a Japanese soldier on exercise in the
Marco Polo Bridge area in the outskirt of Beijing on 7 July 1937.
Since the missing soldier was found and tension eased, the scope
for a settlement similar to what put an end to similar incidents in
the previous few years existed. But Chiang decided to make a
stand on this occasion, instead of appeasing the Japanese
militarists as he had previously done. The big difference this
time was that he now believed he could count on Soviet support
in the event of escalation into a full-scale war.
The raison d’être of this paper is not to review the plotters’
intentions, which cannot be established beyond doubt,4 though
it does ascertain carefully the sequence of events leading to the
mutiny, as well as the role the Chinese Communist Party and
the Soviet Union played in ending it. In so doing, it challenges
the mainstream view in recent Chinese scholarship, represented in
particular by the work of Yang Kuisong, that the Chinese
Communists acted on their own and not on Stalin’s instruction
(Yang, 1995). By using the presidential papers and the personal
diary of Chiang Kai-shek, and the accounts by Zhang Xueliang, it
re-constructs the events that led to Zhang staging the kidnapping.
While Zhang had contemplated such a drastic option for a few
months the fateful decision was only made after a violent verbal
confrontation between him and Chiang 2 days before the mutiny.
By relying on the same original sources as well as TV Soong’s diary
for the Xian Incident it also re-examines the role Zhou Enlai
played. It argues that Jay Taylor’s conclusion that Zhou’s special
personal relationship with Chiang was pivotal needs to be set in the
context of realpolitik (Taylor, 2009: 129–136). Zhou’s diplomatic
skills certainly helped to broker a deal but Chiang moved forward
as he thought he had got an implicit understanding with Stalin, not
because he had a special rapport with Zhou or trusted Zhou.
This paper further examines the nature of this implicit
understanding Chiang thought he had with Stalin and why
something apparently so tenuous was subsequently allowed to
leave marks of great historical importance. It shows that while a
captive in Xian, Chiang believed that he was albeit indirectly and
only implicitly dealing with Stalin. He thought Stalin gave him to
understand that if he would lead China in a united front against
Japan, the Soviet Union would provide support. It was Chiang’s
belief that Stalin would deliver on this understanding that gave
him conﬁdence to start a second front in Shanghai after the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident and commit the overwhelming
majority of his best army against the Japanese in the largest land
battle since the Great War. When he did so he also hoped this
would persuade the West to seek to protect its own interests in
Shanghai by brokering a peace favourable to China. But he was
willing to risk escalation to full-scale war only because he was
conﬁdent that while the West would probably fail him Stalin
would support him. As it turned out once the Japanese found it
necessary to reinforce massively the Shanghai front against
unexpectedly strong and effective Chinese military operations, the
crisis escalated to a point that full-scale war could no longer be
avoided. This paper further shows that the “second united front”
between the Kuomintang and the CCP was not agreed at Xian but
was hastily agreed after the Battle of Shanghai had already started.
The incident
Chiang Kai-shek was personally aware that Zhang Xueling, leader
of the Xian mutiny, had had dealings with the CCP almost
immediately after Zhang and the CCP started their secret dialogues
in January 1936, more than 10 months before the Xian Incident.5
Indeed, it was the failure of forces under Zhang’s command to attack
the remnants of the CCP in Northwest China that took Chiang to
Xian on 4 December 1936. Chiang believed that by personally
superintending Zhang’s command, he could require the Northeast
Army (under Zhang’s command) and the 17th Route Army (a corps
size unit under former Northwest Army general Yang Hucheng) to
co-operate with Central Army units in the region to deal a ﬁnal
crushing blow to the remnants of the CCP forces.
The mutiny and kidnapping took Chiang completely by
surprise, though the risk that the Northeast Army might
rebel did cross his mind in late November (Shilue gaoben,
25 November 1936). When he was captured the ﬁrst issue about
which he sought clariﬁcation was whether his captors were from
the Red Army (Zhu, 1994, 79; account of Sun Mingjiu). It was not
until his captors explained they were from Zhang’s elite
bodyguard regiment and were escorting him back to their
commander that Chiang realized Zhang had really staged the
mutiny. Chiang did not know Yang was a co-conspirator until he
saw soldiers of the 17th Route Army on duty in the streets of Xian
as he was being taken to Yang’s headquarters, where Zhang and
Yang were (Shilue gaoben, 12 December 1936).
Even though the attitude of the Soviet Union under Stalin and
the CCP leadership were critical to ﬁnding a solution to the Xian
Incident the mutiny was staged without their prior knowledge
(Zhang).6 This was notwithstanding the reality that the two key
conspirators (generals Zhang and Yang) had signiﬁcant parallel
dealings with the CCP, and had hoped to secure Soviet military
supplies if they could form some kind of a grand alliance
including the CCP as a partner in Northwest China. The idea of
holding Chiang captive and forcing him to stop the civil war
against the Communists and lead them in a War of Resistance
against Japan was originally put forward by Yang (Shilue gaoben,
15 December 1936; Dou, 2005). Zhang was at ﬁrst hesitant.
Zhang, who lost his father to Japanese military assassins in
1928, had for some time been highly dissatisﬁed with Chiang’s
determination to exterminate the Communist Party before
resisting Japan. He had repeatedly tried to remonstrate with
Chiang. His last attempt before Chiang arrived at Xian took place
at the end of October 1936, when he did so with the backing
of the strongly entrenched leader of Shanxi Yan Xishan
(Zhu, 2006).7 Chiang rebuffed them. This was the end of the
matter for Yan, but Zhang gained the mistaken impression that
Yan would support him if he should act against Chiang’s central
government (Zhu, 2006: 228–229).
What ﬁnally prompted Zhang and Yang to seriously consider
this extreme measure was Chiang’s decision to take overall
personal charge in Xian. This put them on the spot (Yang, 1995:
281). They were presented with a choice of either implementing
Chiang’s order to attack the CCP forces, with which they had a
secret truce agreement, or be re-deployed to Fujian and Anhui,
respectively, and face the consequences later. Zhang and Yang
thus explored the option of kidnapping Chiang to force him to
abandon his “pacify the country ﬁrst” policy and adopt instead
their “resist the external threat ﬁrst” approach. They did not reach
an agreement to act in the ﬁrst 6–7 days of Chiang’s stay in Xian.
The ﬁnal decision to seize Chiang (and those senior generals
who accompanied him to Xian) was made after Zhang and
Chiang ended their meeting on 10 December in an emotionally
charged verbal altercation that revealed how irreconcilable their
basic difference was.8 This took place the day after Zhang went to
meet with students who went on a demonstration demanding the
government resist Japanese aggression. Anti-Japanese sentiments
among the educated population had been running high in the
major cities of China in the autumn of 1936 (Sun, 1993).
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When Zhang met student demonstrators on 9 December he
was moved by their patriotism (Wang et al., 2005: 130; memoirs
of Ju Yiqiao). Knowing that security forces had been ordered to
suppress them if necessary Zhang pleaded with them to disperse
and promised them that within a week he would do something to
show he had not let them down (Wang, 2004: 307–308).
At their meeting the following day, on 10 December, Zhang
tried to persuade Chiang as he had promised the student demon-
strators. Chiang abusively dismissed Zhang’s recommendations as
naive and touched a raw nerve that had been exercising Zhang.
Chiang reportedly said the students who disturbed the peace and
through their demonstrations sabotaged the government’s policy
should be suppressed—by the use of ﬁrearm if necessary (Ibid.:
319; Zhang speaking to Tang Degang after regaining freedom).
Chiang himself remorsefully noted that evening that he had been
too harsh and rough on Zhang, but he had no inkling how great
an impact this emotionally charged meeting had (Shilue gaoben,
10 December 1936). It led to Zhang deciding that the only way to
persuade Chiang was to kidnap him and force him to agree to
reverse the policy priorities. There is no evidence that Zhang had
made up his mind before this dramatic verbal confrontation.
Zhang wanted Chiang to lead the whole country to stand ﬁrm
against an aggressive Japan before consolidating control in the
country.9 The hastiness of the decision was reﬂected in the
deployment of troops in Xian and in executing the coup. Zhang
did not have time to move units of his substantially bigger and
more powerful Northeast Army to Xian, which would have made
sense if Zhang had decided to stage the mutiny sooner.10
The security of Xian at the time was in the hands of Yang’s
17th Route Army, not a long-standing ally of Zhang. Within the
city Zhang had only one bodyguard regiment of the Northeast
Army (Zhu, 1994: 52; Wang Yuting’s account).11 When he ﬁnally
decided to act Zhang took on the role and responsibility as the
leader and invited Yang to serve as the deputy leader of the
mutiny. Even though Yang had a substantially larger force in Xian
that could be deployed to seize Chiang, Zhang sent his own
relatively small unit of bodyguards instead.
Yang did not order his men to join Zhang’s bodyguards in this
critical operation. One cannot absolutely and totally rule out the
possibility that the two leading mutineers trusted each other
though it was unlikely. A much more likely explanation is that
Zhang did not trust Yang’s forces with Chiang’s life, as he merely
wanted to capture Chiang, not to kill or harm him.12 Zhang’s
plan suited Yang as it gave him plausible deniability in case the
mutiny should fail. In such an eventuality Yang had the option to
turn on Zhang with superior force, putting all blame on Zhang,
and stay on the right side of Chiang.
Zhang’s troops tried to seize Chiang at his Xian residence in
the early hours of 12 December, less than 48 hours after their oral
altercation. As his small detachment of bodyguards put up
resistance, Chiang escaped by scaling a wall, badly hurting his
back as he fell into a ditch in the dark and sought refuge on a
hillside. He was found and taken prisoner before 9 o’clock in the
morning.
Chiang’s initial reactions to his kidnapping took Zhang and
Yang by surprise. Instead of opening negotiation, Chiang
adamantly refused to discuss anything with them and declined
food. In the moment of shock Chiang appeared to think at least as
much about his place in history as his immediate safety. Whether
it was in the hill where he was captured or in Yang’s headquarters
Chiang insisted ﬁrst and foremost on his dignity not being
offended.13 No doubt he must have privately calculated that he
was too great a prize for Zhang and Yang to execute on the spot.
In any event his intransigence left Zhang and Yang in a quandary.
Zhang’s plan to force Chiang’s hand got nowhere. They promptly
sought advice from the CCP and speciﬁcally requested Zhou
Enlai, whom Zhang greatly admired, to help move the matter
forward in Xian (Dou, 2005: 169).14
When the CCP leaders in Baoan learned of the incident by
telegram around noon on 12 December, they were both shocked
and jubilant. Mao Zedong reportedly laughed wildly while some,
including General Zhu De, thought it best to kill Chiang
immediately (Zhang, 1974: 1237; Chen, 2001: 320). In the end
it was decided that the Party must keep Zhang and Yang on side
while it sought direction from the Comintern—and Mao drafted
the telegram to Moscow.
In his memoirs Zhang Guotao, who was present in Baoan as
one of the top leaders though not in a dominant position, recalled
that Zhou Enlai was dispatched to and arrived in Xian on
13 December, and the Comintern reply (drafted by Stalin himself)
was received that same evening (Ibid.: 1240–1242).15 According
to Zhang, Stalin saw the Incident as staged by the Japanese
to cause a civil war in China and reduce its capacity to resist
Japanese aggression, and the Soviet Union must not fall into this
trap. Stalin considered Chiang the only person who could lead
China to resist Japan and he instructed the CCP to ensure the
Incident would be resolved by forming a united front with Chiang
as the leader (Zhang, 1974: 1240).16 Zhang’s account is credible as
we now know Stalin did see that it was in the Soviet Union’s
interest that Chiang should lead China to resist Japanese
aggression so that the Japanese militarists could not turn their
attention to the Soviet Union.
Zhang’s account has, however, been challenged by the Chinese
historian Yang Kuisong who insists that the key decision to
resolve the Xian Incident peacefully and by working with
Chiang was reached by the CCP leadership before Stalin’s
telegraphic instructions were received (Yang, 1995: 322–332).17
He has provided evidence that the telegram from Stalin was not
in fact received until 3 days later, on 16 December which was
also the day when Zhou actually arrived in Xian though Yang
got the latter’s date wrong himself.18 He also suggests that the
telegram could not be deciphered and one that could be read
was received on 20 December, the day after the Politburo
meeting in which the key decisions were made. An independent
source conﬁrms that telecommunication between Baoan and
Moscow, which was only established in June that year, was
unreliable for some months and thus the possibility of genuine
difﬁculties in telecommunication with Moscow happened
cannot be eliminated (Kampen, 1989, Chiang Diary, 14, 24
and 25 December 1936).19
This contradicts the interpretation of Hans van de Ven who
suggests unequivocally that the telegram caused the CCP to make
a “u-turn”. According to him Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
decided on 17 December to reverse the CCP’s 15 December
position of demanding Chiang be handed “over to a people’s
tribunal” into one of calling “for a peaceful settlement and the
protection of the safety of Chiang” (Van de Ven, 2003: 187). In
this matter the reliability of van de Ven’s interpretation is marred
by the reality that it would have been very difﬁcult, if not
impossible for Zhou and Mao to have reached a joint decision
and acted together on 17 December as Zhou was by then advising
Zhang and Yang in Xian while Mao was physically in Baoan. To
act together they would have to co-ordinate by telegrams, which
were controlled by Zhang and Yang at the Xian end. Van de Ven
has not provided any evidence to suggest telegraphic coordination
took place or that Zhang and Yang made telegraphic facilities in
Xian available to Zhou for private and conﬁdential communica-
tion with Baoan. While Baoan could and must have used this
facility, which was monitored by Zhang and Yang, to transmit
instructions to Zhou, Mao could not have used it to consult Zhou
on what to do next. In any event, the telegram from Moscow
merely stated that Zhang Xueliang’s act was harmful to forming
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an anti-Japan united front and the CCP should seek a peaceful
resolution of this incident.20
As to Yang’s version no explanation has been provided, by him
or anyone else, as to why it took the CCP 2 days before it asked
Moscow on 18 December to resend this long awaited for and
apparently extremely important telegram, after asserting that this
telegram could not be deciphered.21 This could not have been a
procedural failure or oversight by telegraphic clerks since several
reminders were sent to Moscow before Stalin’s reply was ﬁrst
received. Likewise, Yang has not explained why the CCP decided
on this matter on 19 December, after having decided to seek
Comintern direction ﬁrst and requested the re-sending of
Stalin’s instructions the previous day. No one has explained the
compelling reason why the CCP must decide how to react on
19 December, rather than wait for Stalin’s telegram to be
transmitted again if the original could not be read at all.22
Whether Mao and the CCP leadership decided to reverse
within less than a week their initial consensus over Chiang—to
put him on a show trial—under a direct telegraphic order from
Moscow or not, they acted as Stalin had suggested or desired. The
reality was that even if the key message in Stalin’s original
telegraphic reply could not be read, the views of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union had already been publicly articulated,
authoritatively in an editorial of the Pravda newspaper, the
ofﬁcial organ of its Central Committee, on 14 December (Yang,
1995: 322).23
Unless the CCP allows unrestricted access to its archives of this
period in full it is not possible to establish beyond doubt if
the most important part of Stalin’s telegraphic instructions were
successfully deciphered before the CCP reversed its policy or
changed its position. However, there is no compelling reason to
dismiss the thrust of Zhang Guotao’s recollection though he
misremembered the exact date—for both Zhou’s arrival in Xian
and receipt of Stalin’s telegram, two events that did, as he
correctly recalled, happen on the same day.24 Apart from saying
both events took place 3 days earlier than they did, which made
no difference to the sequence of the major events he recounted,
there is no signiﬁcant inaccuracy in the rest of his recollection
(Chen, 2001: 320, Shilue gaoben, 10 December 1936).25 Indeed,
according to Zhang Xueliang, Zhou knew Stalin’s position when
they met in Xian as Zhou told him that Stalin did not approve of
the incident and wanted Chiang to remain the leader of China
(Zhang, Vol. 39: 25).
On the issue of whether the CCP acted on Stalin’s instruction
John Garver takes the view that Mao probably came to realize the
great value of fomenting a war between the Kuomingtang regime
and the Japanese. Garver thinks this might have contributed to
the change in the CCP’s position. This could be the case. An
alternative or additional, as the two are not mutually exclusive,
explanation would be that the key message in Stalin’s telegram
came through sufﬁciently clearly, particularly if read in juxta-
position with the Pravda editorial. The request, transmitted
2 days later, for resending Stalin’s telegram was to ascertain if
there were speciﬁc details Stalin outlined as the basis for a
peaceful settlement, not the basic policy.26 Hence, the CCP
leadership felt conﬁdent to reverse its earlier decision even before
Stalin’s telegram giving the speciﬁcs was received again. Whether
Mao changed his mind before he received Stalin’s telegraphic
instructions in full or not, “the fact remains that Moscow did
intervene and that intervention helped bring about the reversal of
the CCP’s initial radical position” (Garver, 1991: 173).
Changed priority
All through his captivity and for two decades afterwards Chiang
thought the Communists were behind Zhang and Yang in staging
the mutiny and kidnapping (Li, 2007: 12; record of Zhang’s
interview with Kuo Guanying and Tang Degang, June 1989).
Indeed he could not believe that Zhang staged and led the mutiny
when his bodyguards ﬁrst reported to him that they were under
attack from soldiers of the Northeast Army in his Xian
residence.27 Chiang’s belief that the Communists were behind
this had a signiﬁcant impact on how he assessed his predicament
and worked out a solution.
The Xian Incident did have a profound impact on Chiang. He
had to confront the prospect of death as soon as he was found by
rebel soldiers. In the ﬁrst meeting Chiang had with Zhang as the
latter’s prisoner, Chiang felt he could not dismiss the prospect of
being executed after some sort of a show trial (Ibid.). Although
unknown to him at the time, this was essentially what the CCP
decided as their preferred outcome in an enlarged Politburo
meeting held the following day, on 13 December (Yang, 1995:
299–301). It would be unusual if Chiang did not consider this
possibility. In contrast, his repeated demand that his captors
should either shoot him or treat him with dignity and respect was
almost certainly meant to assert his moral authority and to
strengthen his hand if he should negotiate subsequently as he lost
control of the situation. They were not indications that he wished,
as it is implied in his published account of the incident, to
provoke his captors to kill him.28 But the threat to his life was real
and was conﬁrmed in the assessment of TV Soong, who went to
Xian on 20 December to seek a peaceful resolution. Soong
concluded that “the Generalissimo’s life was in the greatest
danger” (Soong’s Xian Diary, 1936). Chiang could not but
reﬂected hard on what he had done and on alternatives that he
could have chosen.
Chiang undoubtedly also pondered what drove Zhang, the
most patriotic of all former warlords whom he treated as a
protégé,29 and an “old comrade” Yang Hucheng to such an
extreme measure.30 Although Chiang asserted that Zhang became
repentant as Zhang was moved by his determination to resist
Japan after reading his diary, the reverse was almost certainly
closer to the truth (Chiang Diary, 14 December 1936).31 Zhang
did read Chiang’s diary and noted entries showing Chiang’s
determination to resist Japanese aggression but it had little impact
on him (Zhang, Vol. 84, 51). Zhang could not have been moved
as Chiang claimed, as Zhang’s problem with Chiang was not over
intention or determination but over priority—resist Japanese
aggression ﬁrst, or wait until the CCP had been exterminated
(Li, 2007: 4; record of Zhang’s interview with Kuo Guanying and
Tang Degang, June 1989). Even after Zhang had released Chiang
and voluntarily escorted Chiang back to Nanjing to face the
consequences of his act of mutiny,32 Zhang still insisted to
Chiang that the most important of the eight conditions Zhang
initially raised—reorganize the government—must be implemen-
ted (Shilue gaoben, 27 December 1936; see below for the list of the
eight conditions).
In Xian it was Zhang’s willingness to take responsibility and his
obvious sincerity in requesting Chiang to take leadership of a
national united front to resist Japan that must have forced Chiang
to reﬂect.33 It did not take long for Zhang and Yang to disagree
intensely over how to move forward. Chiang noticed this as he
noted, in his diary, Zhang’s repeated efforts to ensure soldiers
from his own bodyguard regiment, rather than Yang’s men who
were in control of Xian, would take charge of his personal safety
(Chiang Diary, 14, 24 and 25 December 1936). The patriotism of
Zhang and the articulated wish of the nation to stand ﬁrm against
further Japanese aggression could not have escaped him as
Chiang examined his predicament.34 While this did not amount
to compelling pressure on Chiang to reverse his policy priority
and accept the terms of his captors, he had to ponder whether
adhering strictly to his policy priority was worthy of dying in the
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hands of the mutineers or the Communists. Should he be killed it
would almost certainly result in a civil war that would facilitate
Japanese aggression against China.35 In the early days of captivity
Chiang had to confront seriously the prospect that he might not
emerge alive.
It was not until the fourth day of his incarceration, the day
when the government in Nanjing started bombing the rebels from
the air, on 16 December, that Chiang felt his personal safety was
less at risk. This was because, in his assessment, Zhang’s remark
that he needed 4–7 days of peace to work out a solution meant
Zhang must be seeking direction from Moscow. In his diary
he noted: “my heart was at ease as the Soviet Union could not
endorse their rebellious conduct and the Soviet Union never
took Zhang seriously” (Chiang Diary, 16 December 1936; my
translation). On the following day as the rebels reduced their
speciﬁc demands from eight to four, Chiang thought this was the
result of instructions from the Comintern (Chiang Diary,
17 December 1936). The fact that Chiang’s analysis was wrong
since neither was due to instructions from Moscow is irrelevant.
What was critically important was that Chiang believed the rebels
would ultimately follow Stalin’s instructions. Whilst still a captive,
Chiang conﬁded in his wife, who had gone to Xian on
22 December to secure his release, that the key was held not by
Zhang whom she knew well but by the Communists (Shilue
gaoben, 23 December 1936).
We now know, from his diary and papers of the 1930s, Chiang
was determined to resist Japanese aggression, and he devoted a
huge amount of resources to prepare for the eventual ﬁght with
Japan. Indeed, before the Xian Incident, Chiang had been
negotiating with the Soviet Union for about a year for Soviet
support for China’s resistance against Japanese aggression in
return for a political solution to the CCP.36 While the Chinese
government had hoped to get a mutual defence treaty with the
Soviet Union, the latter preferred a non-aggression pact (Garver,
1991: 153). The Soviet refusal to sign a mutual defence treaty
raised doubt as to its commitment to help China in the event of
full-scale war between China and Japan.
Prior to the Xian Incident, Chiang had to focus on securing
Soviet weapons and support in the event of war with Japan as he
could not get a mutual defence treaty from Stalin (Chen, 1994).37
The fact that such negotiations were taking place was impor-
tant.38 In the year-long covert negotiations between Stalin and
Chiang both took a utilitarian and calculating approach and “each
was wary of the other’s intentions” (Garver, 1988: 45). Before he
became a captive in Xian, Chiang was not certain that the Soviet
Union would support his government should it go to war with
Japan. With Chiang believing in this juncture that Stalin’s
intervention would be vital to his release he would take any
message or powerful gesture from Stalin seriously.
Such a gesture indeed materialized. During Chiang’s captivity
Zhou Enlai let him know that his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang
Qingguo), who went to the Soviet Union in 1925 to study but had
been kept as a hostage in the Soviet Union, would soon be
allowed to return to China.39 Once this was mentioned to Chiang,
he would have seen it as conﬁrmation of the correctness of his
analysis that he really was dealing, albeit in a shadowy way, with
Stalin. However Zhou might have articulated it Chiang could not
have failed to see that only Stalin, not the CCP, could promise the
release of Ching-kuo. The issue of Ching-kuo’s release had in fact
been used as a bargaining chip earlier in the decade. In June 1931,
an agent of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau, Hilaire Naulen,
was captured by Chiang’s government, which mistook him to be
the head of the Far Eastern Bureau. The Soviet Union made an
offer to trade the release of Naulen and his wife for the return of
Ching-kuo, but this was rejected by Chiang (Yang, 2002). The
CCP was not involved in this negotiation. Thus, when Chiang was
informed of Ching-kuo’s impending release, he could not but
have seen it as an important message from Stalin. Thinking he
knew Stalin for what he was, it would be reasonable for Chiang to
think Stalin was essentially telling him that they should look at
the big picture in ﬁnding a way to end the Xian Incident.40
As to what Stalin wanted speciﬁcally Chiang could only
surmise, as he chose not to negotiate directly with Zhou
Enlai whether Zhou could actually represent Stalin or not. From
Chiang’s perspective what Stalin wanted would have to be
something in the strategic interest of the Soviet Union. He could
reasonably have concluded that Stalin wanted him to live and lead
China to resist Japanese aggression so that Japan could not turn
its attention to the Soviet Union or, at least, get pinned down in
China by the Chinese Army supported by the USSR. What he was
willing to concede was to open or, rather, re-open negotiations
with the CCP to form a united front, something about which he
had had parallel negotiations with the CCP for a year (Mitter,
2013: 64). In return he wanted an implicit Soviet promise to
provide support in their resistance against Japan in the event of
war. This was not an unreasonable assumption for him in light of
the covert negotiations his representatives had with the Soviet
Union and the CCP in parallel. Chiang understandably preferred
to negotiate an agreement after his release rather than under
duress in Xian, though he had made a moral commitment to ﬁnd
a way to reach an agreement subsequently.
The deal
The deal that Chiang made to secure his own release consisted of
two parts. They were a commitment along the line of what
Chiang speculated Stalin wanted, and the speciﬁc verbal agree-
ment that Chiang’s brother-in-law TV Soong (who held no
government ofﬁce at the time) and Madam Chiang (nee May-ling
Soong) negotiated with Zhang, Yang and Zhou.
Chiang adamantly refused to get personally drawn into the
latter negotiations and authorized the Soong siblings to reach
an oral agreement with them. Chiang was willing to reverse the
priority between ﬁghting Japanese aggression and suppressing
the Communists to avoid a civil war and his own death on two
conditions. The ﬁrst was that he was not made to appear to yield to
his captors to save his own skin. For this reason Chiang would not
negotiate directly with Zhang, Yang and Zhou though he endorsed
the principles underlying the verbal agreement with them. He
would not overtly do a deal under duress or compromise on main-
taining his sense of dignity.41 The second condition was that the
Communist Party must declare their support for his government.
An understanding could be reached as Zhou knew Chiang’s
sensitivities and showed great diplomatic skill.
Although Zhou had repeatedly asked to see Chiang, Chiang
declined to meet him until the evening of 24 December. By then
the Soong siblings had already reached a verbal agreement with
Zhang, Yang and Zhou. This meeting happened because Zhou
insisted on it. Chiang ﬁnally conceded but on the condition that it
was only a meet and greet affair (Shilue gaoben, 23 December
1936). Chiang’s record shows that this meeting did happen and
no negotiation took place (Shilue gaoben, 24 December 1936). But
Chiang reversed his previous decision not to have any exchange
of substance with Zhou the following morning. Since the only
event that happened between the evening of 24 December and the
morning of 25 December was the “meet and greet” affair, this
would have to be the occasion when Zhou passed on, most
probably by way of polite pleasantries, the all important message
from Stalin that Chiang Ching-kuo was well and would be
returning to China soon (Shilue gaoben, 24 December 1936).
What else could have caused Chiang to change his mind over the
issue of speaking to Zhou personally?
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Indeed, Chiang met Zhou again in the presence of TV Soong in
the morning of 25 December, the day of his actual release. This
was the only meeting in which Chiang agreed beforehand that he
would discuss with Zhou the basis for future cooperation and, in
reality, the terms of his release. According to Soong, Zhou
explained:
[F]or one year the communists had tried to avoid ﬁghting in
order to preserve the national strength. They have not made
any capital out of the Sian incident and the measure suggested
were the same that they put forward months ago. Now they
want his personal assurance (1) to stop剿共[jiaogong or
exterminate the Communists]; (2) to enrol the communists to
ﬁght Japan; (3) to be allowed to send some representative
to explain to him in Nanking.42
In Chiang’s own personal account, which was not published
and was undoubtedly written to cast himself in a positive light but
its substantive points are corroborated in Soong’s diary entry,
he told Zhou:
You must know that your wish of I saying “No extermination
of the Communists from now on” is something that I cannot
say now. You have to know that I have devoted my whole life
to achieve national uniﬁcation and the centralized command
of the armed forces of the nation… If you and your colleagues
will not undermine national unity, will obey the Central
Government, and fully accept my command as part of a united
army, I will not only not seek to destroy you but will also treat
you in the same way as other army units.43
To this Zhou simply replied: “The Red Army will accept
Mr Chiang’s command, will support uniﬁcation under the
Central Government, and will not undermine it” (Ibid.; my
translation).44 Notwithstanding the positive gloss put on this
exchange it probably captured the spirit of the exchange.45
This understanding could not have been reached so easily
without Zhou’s diplomatic ﬂair and his insistence on passing
Stalin’s message in the “meet and greet” meeting. Zhou gave
Chiang time to ponder and work out the meaning of Stalin’s
message. He ensured Chiang did not feel his sense of dignity and
authority had been affronted. As Soong noted in his diary, after
this brief exchange Zhou left and said to Soong “the General-
issimo was exhausted so he would not talk too much to him
but that there are certain things” to be conﬁrmed between him
and Soong, adding that “as an old subordinate he knows the
Generalissimo is a man of his word” (Soong’s Xian Diary,
25 December 1936). The basic deal was, in plain language, to
open negotiations after Chiang’s release for a united front against
Japan under Chiang’s leadership, with details of arrangements to
be worked out later and on the understanding that Soviet
assistance would be available in the event of war with Japan. In
other words, Chiang and Zhou did not reach an agreement to
form a second united front between the Kuomintang and the
CCP in Xian.
As to the more speciﬁc, and from Chiang’s perspective
secondary, part of this deal, the starting point was based on the
original eight demands that Zhang and Yang announced
immediately after the kidnapping and without the input of the
Communists. They were:
1. Reorganize the government in Nanjing … to enable all parties
to join in and take part to save the nation.
2. Stop all civil wars.
3. Immediately release all patriots arrested in Shanghai.
4. Release political prisoners in the whole country.
5. Allow popular movements that promote the national salvation
movement.
6. Protect the political rights and freedom for all people to form
political parties and hold demonstrations.
7. Truly implement Sun Yat-sen’s will.
8. Immediately convene a national salvation meeting (Zhu,
1993; Telegram from Zhang and Yang to Liu Xiang,
12 December 1936).
With the injection of the CCP’s own demands and Yang’s
concern over whether Chiang would go back on whatever
agreement he might reach once he returned to Nanjing, a
somewhat different set of ten points were agreed in the ﬁnal
unwritten understanding. Reached between Zhang, Yang and
Zhou on the one side and the Soong siblings on the other they
were, according to Zhou:
1. Kong Xiangxi (HH Kung) and Soong will form a new
government that excludes pro-Japanese individuals.
2. Withdrawal of Central Army units from the northwest.
3. Release of “patriotic leaders”.
4. End the campaign to exterminate the CCP. Rename the Red
Army and put it under a united command when a War of
Resistance against Japan is started, 3 months later.
5. Reorganize the Kuomintang within 3 months and involve
others in the government.
6. Staged release of all political prisoners.
7. CCP to be allowed to operate openly when a War of
Resistance is started.
8. In terms of foreign policy: ally with the Soviet Union and
liaise with Britain, the United States and France.
9. Chiang to take responsibility for the Incident and resign from
the ofﬁce of Premier.
10. The CCP agrees to support TV Soong against the pro-Japan
faction within the central government and keep a secret agent
in Shanghai to liaise with Soong (Zhou, 1980: 72–73; Report
to the CCP dated 25 December 1936).46
After he returned to Nanjing, Chiang did not keep all the
speciﬁc promises his agents made to Zhang, Yang and Zhou. But
he honoured the brief verbal undertaking he himself made to
Zhou. Chiang appeared to have made a distinction between the
two though the latter was in effect included in the former. The
latter had to be implemented for two reasons. It was a matter
of personal honour for him. More importantly, this implicit
undertaking to reverse the national priority was predicated on
Stalin agreeing to come to China’s assistance in a future war with
Japan, something he had wanted for some time. He treated the
rest of the unwritten understanding agreed to by the Soong
siblings as a list of additional policy changes to be implemented if
possible. This suggests the apparently changed atmosphere in the
country was not enough to require Chiang to fulﬁl all the terms
for his own release.
In dealing with Zhang and Yang, Chiang tried to appear
magnanimous. Although the kidnapping was for all intents and
purposes a mutiny none of its leaders was given a death sentence.
Zhang, the leader of the mutiny who voluntarily surrendered
himself, was promptly tried and sentenced to 10 years imprison-
ment in a court-martial (Sima, 1989). Chiang then requested
clemency and put him under the supervision of the Military
Commission, which in effect meant putting Zhang under house
arrest in a comfortable setting (Shilue gaoben, 4 January 1937).47
Yang, who remained in Xian, tried to negotiate speciﬁc arrange-
ments that would protect his power base. After the Northeast
Army imploded as an organization in the absence of Zhang and
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units of his own 17th Route Army switched allegiance to Nanjing
in early 1937, Yang was required to relinquish his command, and
travel overseas at government expense for 6 months (Fu, 1989).
He was removed from the Army List, and was put under de facto
house arrest after he returned to China.48
Although working out the future of Zhang and Yang was
politically delicate, it was largely a matter of striking a balance
between pre-empting future mutinies and projecting an image
that Chiang was fair, honourable, strict with military discipline
and yet apparently magnanimous. Chiang could not afford
to let the rebels keep the northwest outside of the central govern-
ment’s authority after staging a mutiny. It would otherwise have
rekindled residue warlordism. He achieved his objective by a
careful deployment of central government forces to put pres-
sure on the rebels—a clear violation of one of the terms for his
release—and allowed internal tension among the rebels to unravel
their coalition. In this Chiang largely succeed, which implied the
non-fulﬁlment of some of the key terms Zhang and Yang
imposed for his release.
The truly monumental decisions Chiang had to make after the
Xian kidnapping concerned what to do with the CCP, China’s
relations with the Soviet Union and the national expectation that
his government would stand up to further Japanese aggression.
All three issues were closely intertwined. Indeed, if Chiang
thought the formation of a united front with the CCP was not
critical to securing Soviet aid, there would have been no greater
need for him to honour his pledge to Zhou than for the
understandings reached with Zhang and Yang. While Chiang did
feel his sense of honour should require him to uphold the
gentlemen’s agreement he did break other promises. In the end,
as will be explained below, it was his belief that national interest
took precedent that caused him to treat the CCP differently for
considerations over the big picture.
Decisions leading to war
Chiang had been determined to stand up against Japan and
remove repeated Japanese humiliation at least since the Mukden
Incident of 1931 when the Japanese Army forcefully seized con-
trol of Manchuria, though he also saw the need to accommodate
repeated Japanese aggressions until China had built up the
capacity to resist (Shilue gaoben, 21 and 22 September 1931).49
While the outburst of popular patriotism during the Xian
Incident must have affected him, it does not mean he had as a
result made up his mind to go to war when the Japanese make
their next aggressive move. To act on the articulated patriotism
would have been emotionally easy for him. But as a hardnosed
realist whose decisions had implications for national survival he
could not afford to act on emotion or popular expectation. In
terms of his determination, it should be recognized that even
though he kept this secret he had already ordered in October
1936, before the Xian Incident, the stockpiling of aviation fuel,
pre-positioning of ammunition in strategic locations and
planning by government departments to relocate inland (Shilue
gaoben, 6 October 1936). The efforts to build defensive structure
in the event of a conﬂict with Japan focused on the Shanghai–
Nanjing area, with additional defensive installations also built
further up the Yangzi River all the way to Wuhan (He, 2011). The
critical issues for him after the Xian Incident remained, however,
how to secure the resources to resist Japan, and when and where
to stand and ﬁght.
After 1931 Chiang had worked on the basis that the Chinese
government needed several years to build up its military and
political capacity and to eliminate the CCP and residual
warlordism to stand united against the might of Japan. This
was the fundamental consideration behind the policy of
“pacifying the country before resisting the external threat”
(攘外必先安内) (Yang, 2002: 393–399). The Xian Incident gave
him an opportunity to rethink this strategy. Starting in early 1937
Chiang gave higher priority to the avoidance of a civil war
(Chiang Diary, 5 February 1937).
But the reality continued to be that China did not have the
military and logistical capability to defeat Japan. Even its capacity
to resist a major Japanese military incursion over any period of
time was limited. A top-secret document among Chiang’s papers
reveals that in 1937 the Chinese Army had only 190 million
bullets in stock, whereas by the calculation of its planners the
Army would need 300 million bullets to sustain 50 divisions in a
month of full-scale war.50 The only way that China could resist a
major Japanese incursion was for it to secure external support and
supplies. Chiang thought that the democratic countries like
Britain, France and the United States would offer no help in the
event of China going to war with Japan (Mitter, 2013: 76–77).
Hence, to reverse China’s defence priority he must ﬁrst get the
Soviet Union committed to support it in war—knowing full well
that the price was to ﬁnd a political, rather than a military,
solution to the CCP.
To proceed, Chiang needed to ascertain in parallel the
intentions of both Stalin and the CCP leadership. The attitude
of Stalin was pivotal, as the real issue was the reliability of Soviet
military assistance in the event of war. The reafﬁrmation of
Stalin’s goodwill and willingness to help materialized in April, as
the Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Bogomoloff informed Chiang that
“the Soviet Union would provide China with military hardware
should a war with Japan break out” (Yu, 2006). This was quickly
followed by the promised return of Chiang Ching-kuo to
China.51
Chiang did not immediately respond to these Soviet moves as
the Soviet Union still insisted on signing a mutual non-aggressive
treaty, which would have required the Chinese Government to
accept the Soviet Union’s privileged position in Outer Mongolia
and over the Chinese Eastern Railway (Sun, 2006). Chiang
dropped reservation over this after the start of the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident. On 8 July 1937, the day after the incident started,
Chiang pondered if the incident would turn into “a total War of
Resistance”, for which China was not yet ready. As he did so he
decided the “most critical” issues were to reach “an agreement
with the USSR for the supply of military equipment and the
conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty” (Garver, 1987).52
The attitude of the CCP was also signiﬁcant as Chiang
conceded the CCP “should be accepted back into the fold under
certain conditions, but it must be kept within deﬁned perimeters”
(Chiang Diary, 5 January 1937). He was not prepared to allow the
CCP use a war against Japan to rebuild its political and military
might so that it could seize power after the end of the war. It was
with this in mind that Chiang insisted on several conditions for
forming a united front with the CCP, viz.: no military command
above divisional level (which was a roughly 10,000 men unit); no
maintenance of a territorial base; and the transformation of the
CCP forces into regular units of the National Revolutionary Army
of speciﬁed strength (Chiang Diary, 6 and 10 March, 17 May and
7 June 1937). This marked a great concession on Chiang’s part as
the maximum number of Communist troops he had previously
been willing to allow in the secret negotiations that took place
prior to the Xian Incident was only 3,000.53 The other matters
involved were relatively easy to fudge but the CCP refused to
accommodate Chiang’s core demands. As late as June 1937
Chiang still tried to persuade Zhou that the CCP should accept
the central government’s bottom line so that an agreement for a
united front could be reached (Shilue gaoben, 9 June 1937). Prior
to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident Chiang thought the CCP was
insincere in its offer to cooperate but he saw no alternative to
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negotiation (Chiang Diary, 15 March 1937)—as long as he was
still seeking a Soviet commitment to help China in the event of
war with Japan.
In the end the Marco Polo Bridge incident happened before
Chiang could complete his negotiations with Stalin and the CCP.
It forced his hand. Chiang had to make choices and monu-
mental decisions with little time to consider their long-term
consequences.
Although the initial incident was contained after the missing
Japanese soldier was found, Mao surmised that Chiang would
have to back down in his conditions for forming a united front if
the Japanese forces resumed hostilities (Sheng, 1992). On 27 July,
the date the Japanese Kwantung Army launched a new assault
against Beijing after a lull Mao thought war could no longer be
avoided and instructed Zhou not to negotiate further with Chiang
until the latter started making concessions (Jin, 1998: 443). Mao’s
assessment was accurate—Chiang noted in his diary that evening
that he did not see how war could be avoided (Huang, 2012).
On 22 August, the day after Chiang’s government signed a
non-aggressive pact with the Soviet Union and 9 days after
ﬁghting started in Shanghai, Chiang quietly conceded to Mao’s
terms for a united front (Sheng, 1992: 169). But no formal
agreement was signed. The Communist forces became the 8th
Route Army simply by an instruction issued by Chiang. Chiang
accepted “the united front” as a price to secure Soviet military aid.
In fact when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened Chiang
adopted a dual track approach. He did not simply decide to stand
and ﬁght. On the one hand he tried to settle this new Japanese
provocation by negotiation but only if diplomacy could restore
the status quo ante (Chiang Diary, 14 July 1937). On the other
hand, mindful of Stalin’s promise of support, he prepared for war
and was not willing to accept humiliating terms similar to those
that had settled previous incidents. Thus, he quickly took steps
that put China’s armed forces on a war footing and prepared to
open a second front if the Japanese militarists should push
further. The latter materialized when the Japanese assaulted
Beijing on 27 July and seized it the following day (Chiang Diary,
27 July 1937).
In addition to rushing reinforcements to North China Chiang
deployed the most elite divisions of the Central Army, the
German trained and equipped 87th, 88th and 36th divisions, to
Shanghai. As he did so he violated the 1932 agreement that settled
the Shanghai Incident of 1931.54 On 11 August he instructed
them to advance to designated assault areas. Chiang ordered them
in the evening of 13 August to launch a full scale attack on
Japanese Marines in Shanghai and open a second front in an area
where he had made the best preparation for war (Benton and
Tsang, 2006; He, 2014; : 235). In so doing he took a risk.
Counting on Soviet support—albeit at a price—Chiang was
prepared to ﬁght a “long” War of Resistance but he also hoped
that a robust defence of Shanghai, where the Western powers had
vast interests, could get them to intervene and force Japan to
agree to a settlement less prejudicial to China’s interests. In the
end the battle captured the imagination of both combatant
nations and marked the point of no return in transforming the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident into the full-scale war of Resistance.
Indeed, the day after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident Chiang
sought to strengthen China’s capacity to ﬁght by securing Soviet
support. On 8 July Chiang approached the Soviet Union for a
mutual defence agreement, which he had long sought (Sun, 2006:
147). After the battle of Shanghai started he asked the Soviet
Union if she would consider joining the war (Yang, 2008).55
Stalin rejected both requests as his motive was to tie the Japanese
down in China so that they could not attack the Soviet Union. He
had no wish to get the Soviet Union directly involved in the war.
However, Stalin did fulﬁl his side of the bargain that Chiang
thought was implicitly raised in Xian, though not without
conditions. The Soviet Union responded to Chiang’s request
for support by insisting on signing a non-aggressive pact as a
condition for providing weapons to China (Chiang Diary,
2 August 1937). Once large scale ﬁghting with the Japanese
started Chiang could no longer afford to worry about the long-
term implications for Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia
and the Chinese Eastern Railway. He authorized the signing of
such an agreement on 21 August, less than 10 days after
ﬁghting commenced in Shanghai (Qin, 1981; full text of non-
aggressive treaty dated 21 August 1937). In return the Soviet
Union delivered 400 aircraft and other matériel valued at over
100 million Chinese yuan by the middle of October (Sun,
1993: 112).
Indeed, Soviet aircraft and pilots challenged the Japanese
dominance of the sky after the Chinese Air Force suffered
horrendous losses by the end of the battle of Shanghai (Chiang
Diary, 2 October and 28 November 1937; : 259). To illustrate the
scale of Soviet support in the early years of the war, Chiang
requested matériel to equip 20 divisions of the Chinese Army
from the Soviet Union in 1938 alone.56 In the course of the
Wuhan battle in the third quarter of 1938, Stalin indicated that he
would consider providing arms for up to 60 divisions and an
additional 500 aircraft (Shilue gaoben, 6 October 1938). Chiang
did not get everything he requested but Soviet matériel was
critical to sustain China’s war efforts up to March 1941 (Qin,
1981: 295). It was provided to serve Soviet interest and formally
paid for by Chinese strategic minerals (Yu, 2006: 16–17). The
additional informal price Chiang had to pay was to allow the CCP
to continue to exist. The most important assumption Chiang
made over the intentions of Stalin when he was a captive in Xian
was vindicated.
Conclusions
Although the attitude of Stalin was critical to the resolution of the
Xian Incident, Hans van de Ven is not fully justiﬁed to pro-
nounce that the CCP simply reversed itself on receiving a direct
telegraphic order from Stalin to do so. Stalin’s attitude
undoubtedly inﬂuenced how the CCP handled the incident. It
was also seen by Chiang as the most important factor in securing
his own release. But van de Ven’s contention is not supported by
available evidence. Young-Tsu Wong’s claim, from the opposite
spectrum, that Chiang was released not by order of Moscow but
because he met his real captors’ terms contradicts evidence
available as well. Equally, Yang Kuisong’s assertion that the CCP
made the key fateful decision on its own is unconvincing. The
reality was that the CCP and Mao reversed their initial position to
one that dovetailed that of Stalin within a week. The weight of
evidence suggests the top CCP leaders did not make this change
under a direct telegraphic order from Stalin on16 December but
did so after they came to know Stalin’s views.
One must not lose sight of the reality that Stalin’s attitude
represented at most one of the key factors for a solution. It would
not have been decisive if Chiang did not react as Stalin hoped he
would. Respond Chiang did. Once he saw that Stalin had
signalled him to look at the big picture he found it possible to
endorse in front of Zhou an agreement his agents reached with
his captors and Zhou. If TV Soong’s assessment in his diary is
correct even as late as 24 December, the day Zhou passed on
Stalin’s message that Chiang Ching-kuo would soon be allowed to
return to China and 1 day before Chiang’s release, the deal could
still have collapsed and Chiang might have refused to endorse it
personally. Such an assessment was corroborated by Chiang’s
own private record (Shilue gaoben, 24 December 1936). Whether
Chiang would have done a deal with his captors if he had not
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received Stalin’s signal cannot be known with certainty. But once
Chiang thought he got conﬁrmation of Stalin’s intention in the
evening of 24 December, he stopped being reticent in dealing with
his captors who were prepared to release him. He cooperated with
Zhang and had a substantive conversation with Zhou that secured
his own release within 24 hours. Yang, who was concerned about
his own safety after Chiang returned to Nanjing, was left in the
cold by both Zhang and the Communists.
Zhou’s diplomatic ﬂair greatly facilitated this process but the
evidence available does not conﬁrm the popular belief in China,
reiterated by Jay Taylor, that Zhou played an indispensible and
pivotal role. Neither Zhou, nor the CCP nor Stalin could have
required Zhang and Yang to release Chiang. What really made a
settlement possible were Stalin’s astuteness in signalling Chiang
his commitment to support China in a war against Japan, and
Chiang’s success in reading and responding positively to this
signal. Zhou’s greatest contributions were two. First he insisted on
having the “meet and greet” meeting on 24 December and thus
created an opportunity to pass on Stalin’s message. The second
was to assess correctly what Chiang would tolerate in how to
endorse the deal without appearing to have done so under duress,
and thus maintained his sense of dignity and vanity. An
alternative Communist representative might not have Zhou’s
touch but as long as he did not offend Chiang directly, it is
reasonable to conclude that Chiang, who was always looking at
“the big picture”, would still have tolerated the deal, once Stalin’s
message and “sincerity” was conveyed.
The Xian Incident did have great consequences. To be sure it
did not change Chiang and make him suddenly determined to
ﬁght Japan. It also did not produce an oral agreement for the
forming of a second united front between the Kuomintang and
the CCP, as has been taken for granted. Reaching an under-
standing with Zhou Enlai that he would, after his release,
negotiate with the CCP did not amount to reaching an agreement.
Previous negotiations between them did not produce anything
like a united front and the risk of failure remained real. The
reality was that Chiang had been determined to resist Japanese
aggression for several years, and had had covert negotiations with
the Soviet Union and the CCP as he prepared to confront
forcefully Japanese aggression. What the Incident did do was to
induce Chiang to alter his priority as he changed the assessment
of the likelihood of Soviet support in the event of a war
with Japan.
Before Xian Chiang preferred to unify the country, which
included exterminating the CCP, to get China ready to go to war
against Japan. After the Incident he decided that he and his
government should take a robust stance against the next
aggressive move of the Japanese militarists. For this he needed
external support. The only realistic source was the Soviet Union.
Notwithstanding the year-long covert negotiations that preceded
the Xian Incident it was as a captive in Xian that Chiang felt
sufﬁciently conﬁdent that Stalin was looking at the big picture—
how to confront and survive the rising ambition of the Japanese
militarists against their respective countries—as he was. He
thought he got conﬁrmation of this when Stalin made the grand
gesture of promising to release his son Chiang Ching-kuo. It
showed that Stalin wanted him alive and would support him to
lead China in a war resisting Japan. Chiang did not reach a
speciﬁc and clear agreement over this with his Communist
interlocutor Zhou Enlai but he could see the Soviet Union’s self
interest would make such an implicit deal a real commitment. But
since the price for Soviet support and his own release was for
Chiang to form a united front with the CCP, he agreed in
principle to work for one after his release.
While the Xian deal was critical to Chiang’s decision to make a
stand over the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the former did not
lead to the latter. Up to 7 July 1937 Chiang had reached no
agreement with the CCP (and did not implement roughly half the
terms for his own release in Xian), let alone make joint
preparations, in anticipation of an incident like that which took
place in the Marco Polo Bridge area. The Incident took him by
surprise. His reactions were not based on a pre-conceived plan.
The changed political situation and atmosphere, unfolding events
and above all his new assessment of Stalin’s intentions guided
Chiang in his responses. Under his leadership China drifted into
the War of Resistance as his attempt to open a second front in
Shanghai escalated out of control. The War of Resistance was not
the result of an agreement reached with the CCP at or shortly
after the Xian Incident to form a united front to wage a full-scale
war against Japan.
After Xian Chiang focused on ﬁnding a way to incorporate the
CCP into the mainstream politics of China on the conditions that
the CCP would adhere to the Three Principles of the People, give
up holding on to a territorial base and integrate its military forces
into the National Revolutionary Army. Chiang was willing to let
CCP members and soldiers to join in the war that he was going to
wage against Japan in due course. But there was no set timetable.
Chiang agreed to let the CCP survive for a while but not to revive.
This was the price he knew he had to pay to secure Soviet military
aid in the event of war with Japan. Chiang still tried to eliminate
the CCP as a threat by political means (Yang, 2009).
But the CCP had a different agenda. It was not willing to be
assimilated by the KMT or be integrated into a KMT led and
dominated political framework. Chiang was still negotiating with
the CCP when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened. In spite
of the public rhetoric Mao did not respond to Chiang’s appeal to
patriotism. He saw an opportunity and seized on the Japanese
aggression to force Chiang’s hand.
Chiang had to make a choice. He decided to stand and ﬁght
unless diplomacy could restore the status quo ante, and urged the
CCP to be patriotic and support the war efforts in the spirit of the
proposals he had already put to it. Mao capitalized on Chiang’s
predicament and insisted on his own terms. As events unfolded
Chiang made signiﬁcant concessions to the CCP to form the
united front to secure Soviet matériel. Chiang could afford to
make a stand against the Japanese as he felt conﬁdent that Stalin
would supply him with weapons and ammunition, provided he
would pay the price Stalin wanted vis-à-vis the CCP.
By allowing the CCP to keep its territorial base, independent
existence and for its forces to be organized into a corps of three
divisions called “the Eighth Route Army” with its own general
headquarters Chiang basically accepted Mao’s terms. In return he
obtained vital Soviet weapons and military supplies that sustained
China in the early years of the war. Chiang brought his regime
scope to survive the Japanese onslaught at the price of, with the
beneﬁt of hindsight, allowing the CCP to revive and prepare to
contest the future of China after the end of the War of Resistance
against Japan.
The release of Chiang’s presidential papers in Taipei and his
diary in the Hoover Institution has been indispensible in helping
to explain why Chiang did what he did. This in turns provides a
good impetus to review and rethink some of the assumptions
of the history of Republican China, in this case the causal
relationship between the Xian Incident and the start of the War of
Resistance against Japan, as well as the Nanking government’s
assessment of the relevance and signiﬁcance of the CCP and the
Soviet Union.
Notes
1 See Yang (1995), Fu (1989), Garver (1991), Chen (2010), Wang (2004), Li (2007) and
various personal accounts in Wang et al. (2005).
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2 The ofﬁcial account is based on Chiang’s Xian Banyueji, which is readily available in
Qin (1984) or in Zhu (1994).
3 No Russian or Japanese language sources have been used for this research.
4 This is so as Yang Hucheng died without giving a full account of his intentions, and
Zhang refused to give a full account of why he staged the kidnapping even after he
regained freedom.
5 Chiang Kai-shek Papers at the Academia Sinica, Taipei, Shilue gaoben (事略稿本),
entry of 27 January 1936. For an example of an intelligence report he received, see
Chiang Papers at Academia Sinica, Taipei, Tejiao Dangan (特交档案) 080114-013,
08A-02099, Dai Li’s report dated 13 March 1934 (should be 1936). Zhang’s initial
dealings with the CCP are chronicled in Yang (1995: 37–39). The availability of the
papers of Hyland Lyon (see http://www.cdp2006.org/show.asp?id= 10508, accessed
27 June 2014), Zhang’s pilot, suggesting that Zhang was in touch with the CCP prior
to the Xian Incident merely conﬁrms what has already been known.
6 I am grateful to Jay Taylor for sharing the notes his research assistant made of this
source.
7 A new revisionist book challenges the established view that Zhang was largely
motivated by his wish to resist Japanese aggression and his disagreement with Chiang
over priority, and suggests that Zhang merely acted as a warlord seeking to secure
Soviet support for creating a semi-independent base in Northwest China. This
account by Chen Shouzhong, however, ignores archival sources and is merely
revisionist for the sake of it (Chen, 2010).
8 Van de Ven (2003: 186) suggests the fateful decision was made earlier, on 7 December,
and the student demonstrations of 9 December were organized by the plotters. This is
not supported by the archives and oral accounts of the principals involved.
9 Whether Zhang was also motivated by his concern that his Army would be
re-deployed to Fujian and himself demoted or not cannot be established or dismissed
with absolute certainty. But if this had been a primary consideration, he would not
have chosen to accompany Chiang to Nanjing after he agreed to release Chiang—as
his co-conspirator Yang did not and was not under pressure to do so.
10 Zhang’s Army numbered roughly 85,000 against Yang’s 36,000 (Van de Ven, 2003:
178–179).
11 Zhang had another antiaircraft regiment stationed outside of Xian.
12 Chiang noted this in his diary 2 days after his capture (Chiang Diary, 14
December 1936).
13 Chiang’s own account of the Incident (Xian Banyueji) was clearly written to project
himself in a positive light. But his assertion that he took a righteous and robust stance
against Zhang and Yang is conﬁrmed independently by Wang Zhiping, a guard at
Yang’s headquarters on 12 December 1936, in Li (2007: 230).
14 Zhang’s own account dated 15 December 1955 whilst under house arrest.
15 Zhang was not the only but was the most authoritative source on this. For the other
sources, see Garver (1991: 169–170).
16 The main thrust of Stalin’s telegram as recounted by Zhang is conﬁrmed by the
telegram in the Soviet archives. See Yang (1995: 299–301) for a summary of the key
points in the telegram.
17 Yang’s conclusions are reached on the basis of telegrams and documents he has
accessed but not all telegrams and between Moscow and Baoan on this Incident.
18 Yang Kuisong says Zhou arrived in Xian on 17 December. In fact, Zhou arrived a day
earlier (Li, 2007: 108; Zhou’s travel companion Tong Xiaopeng’s account).
19 I am grateful to Professor Kampen for drawing my attention to this. The fact that
Baoan and Moscow established direct telecommunication in June 1936 is conﬁrmed
in Liu (1995).
20 Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Secretariat to CCP
Central Committee, telegram of 16 December 1936, Russian State Archives of Social
and Political History (Moscow), collection 495, inventory 74, ﬁle 281, sheet 11. I am
grateful to Jay Taylor for sharing his research notes on the Russian archives. His notes
reproduce the telegram in English.
21 Yang’s interpretation of how the CCP handed this matter is nearly identical account
to that of other CCP sponsored publications. See, for example, Jin Chongji (1998).
22 By Yang’s account, Stalin’s original reply was received on the third day after Mao’s
telegram was sent. It is reasonable to assume that resending the same telegram should
not take longer than 3 days after the request was sent on 18 December. If the CCP
then acted within 1 day of asking for the telegram to be resent it must have a
compelling reason.
23 The Pravda editorial matches the basic position transmitted in the telegram of
16 December.
24 Although Zhang lost out in a power struggle against Mao and had left the CCP when
he wrote his memoirs and could have an axe to grind, intentionally distorting his
recollection of this matter served no purpose.
25 Chen Yongfa also examined the general reliability of Zhang’s account of the Incident
and concluded that it was basically correct.
26 ECCI Secretariat to CCP Central Committee, telegram of 16 December 1936, Russian
State Archives of Social and Political History (Moscow), collection 495, inventory 74,
ﬁle 281, sheet 11. The four points that should form the basis for a settlement were:
(1) the re-organization of the Chinese government to incorporate a wide alliance of
anti-Japanese elements; (2) the guarantee of democratic rights of the people; (3) the
end of the campaign to exterminate the Chinese Red Army and the forging of an
alliance with government forces; and (4) the pursuit of cooperation and support from
countries sympathetic to China’s plight.
27 Jiang Jieshi Riji or Chiang Kai-shek Diary (Hoover Institution, Stanford), hereafter
Chiang Diary, 12 December 1936.
28 Chiang practically admitted as much in his diary entry of 7 January 1937, in which he
noted in what would become the Xian Banyueji it was important to stress that he
provoked Zhang to kill him and his own moral righteousness and integrity during
captivity. His physical courage and assertion of moral authority were conﬁrmed by
rebel soldiers who guarded him.
29 Zhang was an unusually patriotic and responsible warlord. He voluntarily brought
Manchuria to join Chiang despite Japanese displeasure as Chiang united most of
China proper in his Northern Expedition (Songben Yinan, 2007). When Zhang was
still ﬁghting against Chiang’s advancing army in the Northern Expedition, he
deliberately refused to blow up a strategically important bridge to slow down his
pursuers, and also left grain his retreating forces could not take for the poor people in
the region (Zhang, 2008). Chiang reportedly treated Zhang as if he were a younger
member of his family after 1928 (Xiong, 2008).
30 Chiang thought Zhang got Yang involved and referred to Yang as “old comrade” in
his retrospectively written record of the day’s event (Chiang Diary, 12
December 1936).
31 After regaining freedom, Zhang insisted he did not regret staging the Xian Incident.
32 Zhang did not decide to escort Chiang back as a snap decision, as it is widely repeated
in popular books on the Incident. He told others, including Zhou of his plan to do so
before he escorted Chiang to the airﬁeld (Zhou, 1980).
33 Zhang’s sincerity was conﬁrmed as he plotted with Soong to smuggle Chiang out of
Xian against the wish of Yang Hucheng, who enjoyed overwhelming military
superiority against Zhang in Xian city and threatened a “second revolution” against
Zhang in Xian on 24 December (Soong’s Xian Diary, 24 December 1936).
34 Zhang’s patriotism and emotions were observed and noted by one of Chiang’s aides-
de-camp (Wang et al., 2005: 140; memoirs of Ju Yiqiao).
35 No such observation was recorded in his diary entries of December 1936 but
it was noted in the entry of the ﬁrst anniversary of the incident, on
12 December 1937.
36 Liu, Guonan zhijian Yingbian Tucun Wenti zhi Yanjiu, 509–510. If Chiang’s top
priority in the run up to the Xian Incident had been the extermination of the
remnants of the CCP, he could and would have deployed his German trained and
armed divisions to perform this task, rather than ordering warlord units to do so. By
deploying warlord units Chiang could cause attrition of such units, put pressure on
the CCP and thus on the USSR without closing the door for negotiation with the
USSR for a defence treaty against Japan. Once the CCP were completely “extermi-
nated”, he would have one less powerful chip to use when negotiating with Stalin.
37 Chen was the Chinese negotiator.
38 As a result of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, Chiang also had discussions
with the CCP, which were still taking place in great secrecy in November 1936. But
both Chiang and the CCP were playing a double game—they negotiated and at the
same time considered their alternative—launch another attack against the CCP for
Chiang, and form an alliance with Zhang and Yang against Chiang for the CCP. For
the secret negotiations, see Liu (1995: 515–520).
39 The offer to release Ching-kuo is not noted in Chiang’s diary or other ofﬁcial records
so it is not possible to ascertain exactly when and how it was passed on to Chiang.
The fact that this was passed on is noted in Zhang (1974: 1245) and in Taylor (2009:
129), based on a different source.
40 In a diary entry dated 5 May 1945, Chiang noted that the only person who really
understood him was Stalin and the only person who understood Stalin was himself.
It is impossible to know for sure if he felt the same in December 1936 but his later
diary entry suggests Chiang probably thought he had a good sense of what Stalin was
like in 1936.
41 This is conﬁrmed in Soong’s diary in which he writes Chiang “would rather die than
agree to carry out any of the measures till after his return” to Nanking (Soong’s Xian
Diary, 24 December 1936).
42 Soong’s Xian Diary, 25 December 1936—incorrectly dated 21 December. Chinese
characters and English in the original.
43 Shilue gaoben, 25 December 1936 (TV Soong’s diary for the Xian Incident, my
translation). In Xian Banyueji Chiang made no reference to the two meetings he had
with Zhou.
44 Zhou’s version of the meeting can be found in Zhou (1980; paper dated 25
December 1936).
45 Zhou’s very short report of this meeting is also reproduced in Yang (1995: 366).
46 No collaborating Kuomintang account of what was agreed has been found, no doubt
because Chiang never admitted to having done a deal.
47 Zhang’s house arrest lasted long beyond Chiang’s own death in 1975.
48 Yang and his family were murdered by the security personnel responsible for his
detention when the Kuomintang government lost the mainland of China in 1949.
49 Chiang started to feel so after the Jinan Incident of 1928 but it was the Mukden
Incident that made the Japanese threat acute.
50 Tejiao Dangan, 080102-031, 08A-00481, Plan for distribution of allocation for
armaments and basis for calculation for 1937, top secret, 1937.
51 Chiang Diary, reﬂections for April 1937. This entry merely recorded Ching-kuo’s
return and how his own late mother could rest in peace. The entry revealed no other
emotion.
52 He noted that China was not yet ready in the diary entry of 7 July 1937.
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53 Shilue gaoben, 21 February 1937. CCP accounts suggest Chiang was willing to tolerate
a much larger force.
54 For the Shanghai Incident and its settlement, see Jordan (2001).
55 Chiang did not give up hope until at least December 1937, and possibly, according
to John Garver, the middle of 1938 (Chiang Diary, 5 December 1937; Garver, 1987:
305–313).
56 Shilue gaoben, 5 January 1938; and Tejiao dangan, 080106-063, 08A-01742, Table
showing Main weapons and equipments needed for 20 divisions, 1938.
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